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For a number of reasons government the world over have been unwilling to use water pricing to 
achieve water use efficiency.  This research addresses questions of what policy alternatives to 
water pricing might improve irrigation water allocation efficiency. An empirical framework is 
provided to compare irrigation policies for allocating scarce water to agricultural production in 
Egypt and Morocco. Partial equilibrium agricultural sector models specific to Egypt and 
Morocco were employed for policy tests. Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) was used 
to calibrate the models. Water pricing policy, water complementary input factor tax policy, and 
output tax policy are tested. Results suggest that effective policy depends on the social, economic, 
and environmental contexts of specific regions. The results for both countries demonstrate that 
some of the alternative irrigation policies can work towards directing cropping decisions to less 
water intensive crops and also generating revenues for governments in situations where 
governments choose not to price water. 
Key Words: alternative policy, agriculture, cropping pattern, input tax, output tax, positive 
mathematical programming, water pricing, implementation. 
 
Introduction 
“In all economic activities, water demands depend on two factors, what is being produced, and 
the efficiency with which it is produced” (Gleick). This is especially true in the agricultural 
sector when we look for drivers to promote technology diffusion and lead wise use of irrigation 
water. The drivers should aim to increase productivity per drop through irrigation technology 
innovation and investment (water application efficiency) and allocate water among crops to 




irrigation technologies available for irrigation. Using techniques available today, farmers could 
cut their water demands by 10-50% (Postel). However, both technology diffusion and water 
allocation efficiency improvement have not been easy without appropriate policy and economic 
instruments.  
  In seeking policy and economic instruments regarding the scarcity of water, competing 
views held by economists and policy makers from different countries and regions. Many 
stakeholders believe that access to water is an inalienable human right, a social necessity, and 
that water is critical for maintaining a stable, healthy social and economic environment for many 
regions. However, others tend to view water as a private good: one that should be allocated 
through competitive market prices. The notion that water should be considered as an economic 
good gained prominence at the Dublin conference on Water and the Environment in 1992 (ICWE, 
1992).  This idea was a compromise between those who tend to treat water as private good and 
those who view water access as a basic human right (Perry, Seckler, and Rock).  
Briscoe; Perry, Seckler, and Rock; and Hellegers further clarified the confusion about 
treating water as an “economic good” as distinguished from valuing and charging for water. 
They recognized that treating water as an economic good is not about setting the appropriate 
price for water, but rather about making right choices for allocating water (Hellegers). If the 
choice is made based on a socio-economic trade-off, then economic efficiency is only one of the 
basic criteria in helping make good decisions about the optimal use and allocation of water 
among potential users (Hellegers). This argues that a multidisciplinary approach should be taken 
to address the issue. 
However, invention and implementation of such approaches and policy options for 




countries. Despite a fame of vicious, the economic efficiency criterion is attractive to most 
economists. Much of the literature has focused on the belief that resource allocation efficiency is 
achieved by equating cross sector marginal benefits (Dinar, Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick). The 
literature has covered the following water pricing methods (Tsur and Dinar, 1995): volumetric 
pricing, output pricing, area pricing, tiered pricing, two-part tariff pricing, and market pricing. 
Tsur and Dinar (1995, 1997) and Johansson examined in great detail the various pricing options 
available, and the contributions of these options to the goal of achieving economic efficiency of 
water use. Water pricing method in this paper, however, refers to volumetric pricing mechanisms 
that charge for irrigation water based on consumed quantities.  
Some district analyses have demonstrated that similar pricing policies may have very 
different impacts under different conditions (Tsur et al.), as reflected in the shape (elasticity) of 
the derived demand curves. Farms with steep (inelastic) demand curves will be less responsive to 
price increases. However, when policy makers or project designers do not have a clear 
understanding or information of the shape of demand and supply curves, it will be difficult to 
find the most sensible price that will optimize water use. Tsur and Dinar (1995) found that water 
use is most efficient when pricing, such as Marginal Cost Pricing (MCP), affects water demand. 
However, the main drawback of MCP is the difficulty of including all marginal costs and 
benefits when determining the correct price to charge. Furthermore, as Perry (2001) indicates, a 
high marginal cost for water can reduce demand effectively, but is unlikely to be accepted within 
the politically feasible range. The limited acceptable range of pricing has weakened water pricing 
effectiveness as a policy option. As a result, most pricing reforms have only produced 





However, even with the sufficient information and known about the marginal value of 
water, the implementation of water pricing policy at or close to its marginal value is difficult in 
most of developing and developed countries. The obstacle is mainly from the lagged effect of 
historical water pricing policies. In many countries where irrigated agriculture plays an important 
role, farmers believe low or zero charges are justified. This belief is usually reflected in their 
political systems (Abu-Zeid). Some countries may also lack the tradition, experience, and 
appropriate institutions to price irrigation water. Many water scarce countries have adopted 
macroeconomic policies that have negative effects on agriculture in general and water in 
particular (Diao, Roe, and Doukkali). Most developing countries provide irrigation and domestic 
water supply systems at subsidized rates. By doing so they can secure water and food supplies, 
protect public health, and avoid opposition from farmers and urban poor to raising water prices 
(Abu-Zeid).  
Molle (2002) summarized the reasons why water charges have been generally low for 
agriculture: (1) political sensitivity to increases in food prices; (2) competitiveness in 
international markets; (3) the depressed level of most staple food prices as well as their 
fluctuating nature; and (4) the political risks associated with a significant increase in water 
charges. Numerous studies suggest that maintaining low water tariffs will make this policy 
instrument ineffective in improving water allocation efficiency and increasing agricultural 
productivity (Molle, 2001; De Fraiture and Perry; Perry, 1996; Ogg and Gollehon). Ray looked 
at the social and economic impact of increasing water price in western India. She concluded that 
“significant price increases are politically infeasible, and feasible price increases are 




unrealistic means of encouraging significant reductions in fresh-water demand because the price 
changes needed to generate a 15% fall in demand would have reduced farm income by 25%.  
Sensitive physical, social, institutional, political and economic contexts of many regions 
and countries have left water pricing a contestable policy option. When transaction costs are 
high, it is difficult to move toward market pricing policy (Coase). Johansson et al., (2002) 
concluded that transaction costs make the implementation of water pricing methods difficult. In 
response to high transaction costs, political economy concepts and new institutional approaches 
have been introduced into the analysis of water pricing reforms (Dinar).  Sampath; Rosegrant 
and Binswanger; Tsur and Dinar (1997); and Saleth and Dinar pointed out that water pricing may 
have a better chance of succeeding with minimal costs and less political opposition only when 
the institutional changes within the water sector can rapidly promote decentralization and 
privatization.  However, the problem is that different countries and regions have different 
situations with respect to economic development, demographic growth and technical progress. 
Countries also differ in their levels of economic and political reforms, international 
commitments, social values and ethos changes, and natural calamities, which serve to motivate 
and speed up these institutional changes. 
In summary, limited acceptable ranges of pricing have weakened the effectiveness of 
water pricing policy. High transaction costs embodied in implementation have resulted in slow 
institutional change in most developing countries that depend on irrigation water. This has 
deferred opportunities for saving water resources with water pricing policies within a reasonable 
time frame in these countries. There is a need to circumvent existing water pricing policy 
difficulties by examining other strategic policy options, which is also the major objective of this 




Egypt and Morocco differ in many aspects of agriculture and climate conditions. Even 
though agriculture accounts for 80% of fresh-water use in Morocco, irrigated areas account for 
16% of total cultivated area, compared with 98% in Egypt (FAO, 2004). The major crops in 
Morocco’s irrigated areas are orchards, sugar beets, sugar cane, potato and wheat, whereas Egypt 
has even more irrigated crops including wheat, maize, rice, sorghum, cotton, and sugar cane.  
  Egypt provides a case where rainfall is scarce and the nation’s farmlands are almost 
entirely dependent on irrigation from the River Nile. Egyptian farmers do not have to pay for 
their irrigation water, but are responsible for the maintenance of canals that are attached to their 
fields. The country faces water scarcity due to increasing irrigation and industrial demand, and 
the water administration is very centralized. In contrast, Morocco provides a case where water 
from large scale irrigation has a water tariff, but the rates are very low and do not meet the 
operation and management cost in most regions. Due to irregular rainfall patterns and increasing 
use of irrigation water, it also faces a water scarcity problem. Morocco’s water administration is 
currently undergoing a structural transformation from a centralized political structure towards a 
decentralized system of governance. 
In searching for factors that determine the behavior for irrigation water demand along 
with agricultural production choices, alternative policy options for these two countries are 
considered. The policy options under study are: (1) water pricing; (2) taxation on water 
complementary input factors; and (3) taxation on output based on water intensity and low profit 
crops.  
  The objectives of this research are to evaluate alternative policy options (input and output 
taxes) to see if and how well they can serve as a proxy of water pricing policy in irrigated 




as Morocco), and to analyze the potential impacts on cropping pattern, irrigation water demand, 
welfare, and water agency revenues for each alternative strategic policy.   
 
Methodology and Data 
  Agricultural Sector Model of Egypt (ASME) (Siam) and Agricultural Sector Model of 
Morocco (ASMM) (Doukkali) are used to conduct parallel research on the subject. Both are 
static partial equilibrium (PE) models in which social welfare, in the form of consumer and 
producer surplus from agricultural based commodities, is maximized subject to various resource, 
technical, and policy constraints. In order to achieve the maximized welfare, equilibrium demand 
and supply is required, i.e. the demand and supply balance of the agricultural products will be the 
key equations to solve for activity levels.  
  Water is a limited input in both models. The supply of irrigation water is assumed to be 
fixed and does not be fluctuating over time. The reality, of course, is that there is some 
fluctuation from one year to another. We also realize that irrigation policy will affect not only 
welfare in the agricultural sector, but the economy as a whole. Water policy in agricultural sector 
also affects other sectors of the economy, such as commercial, industrial and municipal 
residential consumption, and protection of the ecosystem.  The agricultural sector models used 
for this research only encompass that sector and thus ignore water related benefits and costs in 
other sectors. 
  The Positive Mathematical Programming Method (PMP) approach, as suggested by 
Howitt (1995), has been employed to calibrate the models. In conventional mathematical 
programming, arbitrary constraints are added to avoid too specialized solutions and calibrate the 




program to observed levels of the endogenous variables. Such a model can yield smoother 
response to changes in prices and constraints.  
   The agricultural sector model of Egypt has also been used to derive shadow prices for 
irrigation water. Water shadow prices can be derived using limited information via mathematical 
programming models (Shunway; Howitt et al., 1980, Kulshreshtha and Tewari; Chakravorty and 
Roumasset; Bontemps and Couture).  The scheme to obtain these prices is as: (a) For a given 
output price, estimate the quantity of water maximizing the profit of the agricultural sector; (b) 
vary the level of water quantities to deduce the shadow prices under different levels of water. 
  Optimal crop production is calculated under various resource constraints and prevailing 
input-output prices. The water shadow price (λ ) constraint is the marginal value of irrigation 
water. Shadow prices for water are determined by solving sum of the producers’ and consumers’ 
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Where α  and β are the intercept and slope of the demand function for crop i;  is the 
land allocated to crop i;   is yield of crop i;  is coefficient between water and yield of crop i; 
is quantity of other inputs j required for crop i per unit land;  is coefficient between other 
inputs j and yield of crop i;  is price for output crop i;  is price vector for input factor j ;  is 
available input levels for input factor j ;  is the PMP coefficient for crop i;   and   are the 
demand and supply of crop i, respectively. 
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λ is the water shadow price.  
Equation (1) is the objective function of the producers’ and consumers’ maximization 
problem. Equation (2) defines the cost function on crop i, and equation (3) is the demand and 
supply balance. Equation (4) is the available land constraint. Equation (5) is the constraint on 
available irrigation water. The levels of the constraint are varied between the interval [0, W*], 
where W* is the maximum water capacity. Each iteration yields a new water shadow price (λ). 
Equation (6) is a constraint for other input factors, and equation (7) is the non-negativity 
constraint on land.  
  Data sets covering production and market dimensions have been used in the research 
models to describe the characteristics of the Egyptian and Moroccan agricultural sector. 
Irrigation water cost recovery data, which will be used for the water pricing policy scenario, is 
from the existing literature.    
The data set for Agricultural Sector Model of Egypt (ASME) covers 1999 national and 
regional levels of land, labor, water resource availability and requirement, yields and fodder 
byproducts. The production of 27 crop commodities and 5 animal commodities in 8 regions are 
included in the model. The ASME has updated prices and cropping patterns to 2001.  
  The Moroccan data from Agricultural Sector Model of Morocco (ASMM) covers 




with 5 irrigation zones and 6 agricultural regions based on climate differences (the amount and 
variability of rainfall). 
  The GAMS modeling software and MINOS 5.0 solver is used to solve and implement the 
model.  
 
The Case of Egypt 
Characteristics and Policy Goals of the Egyptian Irrigation System  
The Egyptian economy depends heavily on the agricultural sector as a source to support non-
agricultural sector growth. The Nile River supplies about 55.5 billion cubic meters of water 
annually to Egypt, and 80% of the water is used in agriculture. Over 90% of Egyptian 
agricultural land lies within the Nile basin and delta. There are three cropping seasons in Egypt, 
winter (November-May), summer (April-October) and Nili (July-October). The main winter 
crops are wheat, berseem (Egyptian clover) and broad beans. Among the summer crops, maize, 
rice and cotton are dominant. Vegetable crops such as tomato, potato, and others are cultivated in 
all seasons. 
  Water scarcity is growing in Egypt because of the competition use among users. 
According to a report by FAO in 2000, to maintain the irrigation infrastructure and conserve 
water, water pricing at cost recovery level and other incentives are needed. However, low cost 
recovery to gravity irrigation supply and subsidized energy cost for pumping groundwater is the 
most common distortion in Egyptian agricultural sector. The price of water is low. A three-fold 
increase would have minimal effect on farmer’s profitability. This report also indicated that 
water pricing may not be a good tool to influence water conservation, but it is needed to raise 




Egypt will be to meet the financial need for irrigation system and to provide incentives for 
efficient use of water.  
Scenario Design for Egypt 
Three policy scenarios are simulated using the ASME model (Siam, 2001): (1) a water pricing 
policy; (2) an input tax policy; and (3) an output tax policy. Table 1 summarizes the scenarios. 
The water pricing scenario observes the effects under different water pricing levels (cost 
recovery Pw1, and two shadow price levels Pw2 and Pw3). Pw1 (0.011696 Le/M
3) is the cost 
recovery water pricing level calculated by Perry in 1996. Pw2 (0.036 Le/M
3) and Pw3 (0.083 
Le/M
3) are shadow prices derived using ASME under 5% and 10% reduction of water capacity 
levels, respectively. Input factor tax scenario includes three sub-scenarios: Nitrogen fertilizer (N-
fertilizer), pesticides, and energy. The output tax scenario taxes paddy rice and sugar cane 
production since these crops are irrigation water intensive and have lower profit levels among all 
other crops in Egypt. Because the agricultural sector model used here is an endogenous price 
model, commodity supply equals demand. Domestic demand and prices are endogenous. 
However, export quantities and export prices are exogenous. In order to observe the response on 
the supply side from policy shocks, upper bounds on the exported quantities for all commodities 
in the model are increased by 20% before testing policy scenarios. Therefore, changes in exports 
are given a minimum (base level) and maximum (20% more than base level) bound.  This allows 
the model to have a better environment to obtain insights into Egyptian export opportunities 
combined with the policy under consideration.   
  The results of the policy simulation are presented in four categories: 1) farmers’ response 




of consumer and producer surplus change contrast with the change in water demand; 3) water 
demand elasticities; and 4) government revenue from each policy scenario. 
Model Results for Egypt 
 Under water pricing scenario, the cropping area decreased for almost all major crops except 
citrus, most of all cotton and vegetables at the cost recovery water pricing level (Pw1) (Table 2). 
Cotton and vegetables have higher profitability than other crops in Egypt. With an increase in 
production cost (water cost), results favor production of higher valued crops than lower valued 
crops. The cropping area of onion and some cotton increased at the pw1 level. At a higher water 
pricing level such as Pw2 and Pw3, the model results show that cropping area of all crops 
decreased. Some crops, such as maize, paddy rice, sugar beet and sugar cane, dropped more than 
others (for example, vegetables). Land goes out of production at the cost recovery water pricing 
level, and at the water pricing levels Pw2 and Pw3. There are two reasons explaining this result: 
1) increasing costs will cause activity levels to decrease until marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost. Land will go out of production if other activities can not be expanded profitably; 2) the 
PMP approach imparts a quadratic cost term which causes production costs to increase at an 
increasing rate as production deviates from the base. In other words, the PMP coefficients likely 
render the model too sensitive to cost and revenue changes.  
   For the water complementary input factor scenario, N-fertilizer and energy taxes results a 
similar cropping pattern change as with the water pricing scenario. However, a pesticide tax is 
not effective in decreasing the cropping area of water intensive low profit crops, such as sugar 
cane and paddy rice. This is because sugar cane does not use much pesticide and pesticide use is 




  On the N-fertilizer tax scenario, we can see that the prominent decreases in cropping 
areas for major crops are from Nili maize, summer sorghum, sugar beet, and sugar cane. These 
crops are ranked comparatively high in N-fertilizer application rate. Cropping area for lentil, 
cotton, and onions increased at a lower N-fertilizer tax rate since their marginal profitability is 
higher than the other crops, although the N-fertilizer application rate are high for both summer 
and winter onions. However, as the N-fertilizer tax rate getting higher, the production of more 
crop types decreased including cotton and vegetables. Soybean cropping area also decreased as 
the N-fertilizer tax rate increased. This is because N-fertilizer has to be used in Egypt for 
soybean production because soils are nitrogen deficient and comprised mainly by sandy and clay 
soils that have low nitrogen use efficiency ratings.  Soybean production in Egypt is low (about 
13 thousand feddans in 2001). The reduction of irrigation water, however, is mainly from the 
decrease in paddy rice production along with sugar cane, wheat, maize, tomato and other 
vegetables.  
  Under energy tax policies, the model tends to shift more land to plant onions and cotton. 
The planting areas for some of the water intensive crops decreased including sugar cane, paddy 
rice, long berseem, and summer maize. These crops grow in specific regions require more 
pumping hours than other crops. Sugar cane in the west delta requires highest pumping hours 
among all crops. Paddy rice in the west delta requires much hours for pumping as well. Energy 
tax also affects the production of potato, tomato and other vegetables which also involve high 
pumping hours during the growing time.  
  Cropping area reduction mainly happens with sugar cane and paddy rice under output tax 
scenario. However, the production of profitable crops, such as lentil, increased up to 26% along 




cropping area of wheat, maize, bean, legume, and sugar beet. The main contributions to 
irrigation water reduction are from sugar cane and paddy rice. Although other crops demand 
more irrigation water as the output tax rate increases, their effects on demand for water is very 
small. More land moves out of production and can not be shifted to producing these crops due to 
the model constraint on export. Land will be allocated to producing more cotton and vegetables 
when the demand constraint is eliminated from the model.  
  Individual policy scenario analyses compare the scenario results with the base level. 
However, because the high sensitivity of the model to any cost and revenue change, the changes 
in irrigation water demand, welfare level, cropping pattern, and generated revenue provide good 
indicators of the direction of change, but not necessarily an accurate magnitude of change from 
the base level.  Because the main purpose of this research is to look at some alternative policy 
options other than water pricing to identify the possible chances of adopting these policies which 
may achieve similar goals to water pricing policy, it is more constructive to compare the results 
of each policy with the water pricing results instead of the base level. 
  Figure 1 plots the percentage of welfare change in the agricultural sector caused by each 
policy scenario, contrasting with its percentage change of irrigation water demand. The pattern 
of welfare change and irrigation water decrease converges at the water cost recovery level and 
lower input or output tax shocks. The pattern of change on welfare and irrigation demand 
diverged when input or output taxes are high. Output tax appears to work better than water 
pricing policy. However, there are equity concerns related to farmers whose major crops are 
paddy rice or sugar cane. It will be hard for them to change the crop mix in the short run. 
Welfare measure change in agricultural sector is negative as it is shown in Figure 1. This is 




producers’ surplus, while the remaining sectors of economy are not taken into account. However, 
if the economy were considered as a whole, reallocation of water from agriculture to other 
sectors would increase global welfare because water value is higher in other sectors. 
  Comparisons on the measure of water demand elasticity is depicted in Figure 2. It shows 
that none of the policy options are elastic. Comparatively, the output tax policy is relatively more 
elastic than others. Among the input tax policies, N-fertilizer tax above 50% elicits larger 
elasticities. Elasticities of N-fertilizer tax, energy tax, and output tax are comparable to 
elasticities with water pricing (Pw2 and Pw3). 
  Revenue generated cross all policy scenarios is calculated and presented in Figure 3. 
Except for the N-fertilizer tax rate of 10% (NF-10%), every policy scenario generated more 
revenues than the cost recovery water pricing policy at Pw1. However, none of the policy 
alternatives can generate as much revenue as the Pw3 water pricing level, which is the shadow 
price obtained when water availability is only 90% of the base level.   
 
The Case of Morocco 
Characteristics and Policy Goals of the Moroccan Irrigation System  
Agriculture plays a very important role in the economic and social domains of Morocco 
as well. Moroccan agricultural production is characterized by rain-fed and irrigated farming. 
More than 84 percent of the total arable land is dry-land farming. Cereals and vegetables are the 
primary crops grown under dry-land agriculture.  Irrigated farming has increased from 73,000 ha 
in 1953 to 1,471,797 ha in 1998. Irrigated land contributes about 45% of agricultural value-
added, employs about 33% of rural labor, and comprises about 75% of agricultural exports 




Agriculture also accounts for 80% of total fresh-water consumption in Morocco. Most 
fresh-water in Morocco comes from rainfall and melting snow collected by large dams. Water 
from these dams is delivered by canal systems. Some areas have ground water supply to 
supplement surface water (Tsur and Dinar, 1995). Surface water is regulated by nine regional 
agricultural development authorities. Water scarcity is also faced by Morocco because of 
irregular rainfall patterns and increasing use in agriculture (USAID). 
Farmers are charged a fee by regional authorities that is generally lower than the water’s 
real values (Diao, Roe and Doukkali). Benabderazik described the interaction between 
institutions and decision-makers in Morocco. He found that institutional change influences 
options available for water pricing and water allocation policies. Nevertheless, water 
administration in Morocco has demonstrated a tendency towards decentralization and functional 
specialization, even though it has a centralized political structure (Saleth and Dinar). Economy-
wide gains from decentralized water allocation have been investigated by Diao, Roe and 
Doukkali. They concluded that macro-economic variables and water market reform together 
influence water reallocation among crops and farmers.  
The present research classifies Moroccan agricultural land into Large Scale Irrigation 
(LSI) Land, Private and Other Irrigation (PRI) Land, and Rain-fed Land (Doukkali). Table 3 
shows that cereals are the main crops grown in each category. Industrial crops, including sugar 
beet, sugar cane, sunflower, and peanuts, are planted on LSI land and rain-fed land. No industrial 
crops are produced on PRI land. Most vegetables and fruits are cultivated on PRI land. In the 
policy analysis that follows, this cropping pattern serves as a starting point for land allocation 
among crops under the different irrigation land classifications. Welfare levels for the agricultural 




regions using LSI and PRI irrigation systems and government revenue from each scenario in 
these regions are presented.  
The irrigation policy goals of Morocco are 1) to allocate irrigation water from low profit 
crop production to more profitable crops, such as fruits and vegetables, and 2) to collect revenue 
in order to meet the M&O costs and investment needed for supplying more irrigation water to 
balance increasing demand.  
Scenario design for Morocco 
Three policy scenarios for Morocco were simulated using the Moroccan Agricultural 
Sector Model (MASM) (Doukkali): 1) a water pricing scenario, 2) a tax on energy use for 
pumping; and 3) an output tax on cereals and industrial crops. Table 4 describes the policy 
scenarios for Morocco. 
The water pricing scenario increases the base water tariff to its cost recovery level for 
regions using water from large scale irrigation systems (Table 5). Historically, improvement of 
the recovery rate of the water fee has had positive aspects with respect to the objectives of 
financial viability, economic effectiveness, and equity. From the institutional perspective, this 
scenario approximates Morocco’s anticipated future water tariff system.    
An energy tax for pumping lies in the category of taxes on water complementary input 
factors. Taxes on N-fertilizer and pesticide are not tested for the Morocco case because these 
inputs are used both on irrigated land and in rain-fed production. There is no realistic way to tax 
these inputs only for irrigation production. 
Output taxes are equivalent to a price reduction on certain crops. Output taxes are levied 
on cereal crops and industrial crops grown in LSI land. Among all the crops cultivated on LSI 




of total irrigation water (Table 6). The main industrial crops under LSI are sugar beet, sugar cane 
and peanuts. Sugar beet production consumes 7.9%, sugar cane production consumes 7.9% and 
peanut production consumes 6.8% of the total irrigation water served by the LSI system. Wheat 
and industrial crops receive producer price subsidies (Diao, Roe, and Somwaru). More 
specifically, wheat and sugar have border protection while sunflower receives a deficiency 
payment. Wheat and sugar beets are not among the most water intensive crops. However, they 
use a significant amount of land. This causes water demand for wheat and sugar beet to be high. 
Sugar cane, peanuts, and sunflowers use water more intensively compared to most of the other 
crops. Output taxes could serve as a mechanism to reallocate water use from producing cereal 
crops and industrial crops to producing vegetables and fruits which are the major export goods in 
Morocco. 
Unlike the ASME model for Egypt, imports in the ASMM are endogenous instead of 
exogenous. However, exports are exogenous in the ASMM as well. In order to capture the export 
opportunities and responses from the policy scenarios tested, an export bound is also assumed in 
the policy simulation: the lower bound of exports is the base level and an upper bound is set to 
20% higher than the base level.  
Model Results for Morocco 
Water pricing at the cost recovery level affects cropping patterns in both irrigated and rain-fed 
land (Table 7). Changes occur on LSI as land used for cereals decreased. There is only a small 
change on PRI for cereal production. The corresponding changes for cereal crops in rain-fed area 
are barley and corn. However, imports for durum wheat, bread wheat, and barley increased. Land 
for producing beans decreased 6% and other pulses decreased by 66% compared to the base level 




sunflower. Land for peanut falls, which leaves room for rain-fed land to use more land than base 
scenario for peanut production. Land for producing greenhouse tomato, vegetables for 
processing and olives also increased on LSI.  
  Land allocation changes on PRI mainly with forage crops and vegetables. Forage crop 
increased. Except for early potato, land for vegetable production increased. This compensates for 
the decrease on land used to produce vegetables on LSI. Land allocated to oranges decreased on 
LSI, but increased on PRI.  
  Tables 8 to Table 10 show cropping pattern changes under different land classifications. 
Table 11 gives the import changes under corresponding scenarios. Cultivation of vegetables and 
fruits increased under all policy scenarios on LSI land (Table 8). Except for grape, it decreased 
slightly under water pricing and energy tax. Cereals and industrial crop decreased as well under 
all policy scenarios, although not in the same magnitude. Land for sunflower increased due to the 
decrease in import of raw sunflower oil (Table 11).  
  Table 9 provides changes in irrigated land (PRI) under energy tax and output tax 
scenarios. There are small decreases in land allocated to cereal and clover due to an increasing 
energy tax rate. More tomato, strawberry, melon, other vegetables, and olive, are planted on PRI 
with an energy tax. Increase on PRI land for some vegetables and olive production can also be 
observed in the model results.  
  In the rain-fed region (Table 10), land allocated to produce barley, forage, peanuts, 
sunflowers, and grapes increased to compensate the decrease of these crop productions on LSI 
and PRI at the corresponding energy tax rate. More durum wheat, bread wheat, and barley are 
imported into the country as the energy tax increases. The increase of energy tax rate enhanced 




however, imports of durum wheat and bread wheat balanced the domestic demand (Table 11). 
The total land for cultivation decreased on LSI and PRI while the land for cultivation increased 
on rain-fed area. 
  Contrast of the effects on agricultural sector welfare and irrigation water demand under 
different policy scenarios is shown in Figure 4. Unlike the model results for Egypt, welfare 
increases in the Morocco case. Welfare gains in Morocco are derived from the other two sub-
sectors, rain-fed and PRI land, as the cost and revenue shocks are on LSI land. More rain-fed 
land is cultivated and more vegetables and fruits are produced on both PRI and rain-fed land. 
Compared with the water pricing scenario, an output tax at a 10% rate (OUTP-10%) could reach 
the same welfare level and reduce more irrigation water demand. On the other hand, an energy 
tax at a 200% rate (ENG-200%) reduced irrigation water demand as much as water pricing 
policy did.   
  Figure 5 plots the comparison of water demand elasticity under different policy scenarios. 
Water demand elasticities of energy remain the same with low and high tax rates; however, the 
output tax can be more elastic as the tax rate increased. Comparing with the elasticity of water 
pricing at cost recovery level, output tax is relatively more elastic.  
  Figure 6 illustrates the rank of revenue generated from each policy scenario under 
analysis. Energy tax and output tax at a higher level can also generate a comparable amount of 
revenue compared with the extra revenue generated from water pricing at cost recovery level. 
However, if output tax is just a lower price on the products, it is consumers, not the government, 
who receive the benefit. High energy tax policy can also be another attractive alternative in terms 





Conclusions and Policy Implication  
This research intended to provide a better understanding of alternative irrigation policies 
compared to water pricing by examining irrigation policy options for Egypt and Morocco. The 
profiles of the countries used in this analysis are considerably different. Egypt is a country 
characterized by irrigated agriculture for most of its land. Morocco is representative of countries 
who use mainly rain-fed land for agriculture with a tendency of increasing irrigated land. The 
analysis confirmed the effectiveness of alternative irrigation policy options in Egypt. For the 
purpose of reducing irrigation water demand, conserving water, and meeting the financial 
scarcity of irrigation development and promotion of water saving technology, using high water 
shadow pricing should not be an automatic policy response. Rather, it may be appropriate to find 
alternative ways: 1) output tax on rice and sugar cane could be used to reduce irrigation water 
demand on these two crops. This would promote cultivation of less water-intensive but more 
profitable crops such as sugar beet and other vegetables; 2) a very high tax on N-fertilizer and 
energy may not be possible at the present time. However, these policies demonstrated positive 
impacts and potential in directing the cropping pattern towards more profitable ones, such as 
lentils and vegetables. In the long run, increasing of N-fertilizer and energy taxes could be 
considered as a supplementary policy for Egypt for adjusting irrigation water application; 3) 
alternative policies could also be effective in terms of generating revenue for government or 
irrigation administration. If cost recovery water pricing or higher price levels can not be 
implemented in Egypt, lower levels on water complementary input factors taxes and output tax 
policy can meet this goal as well. However, output taxes may not be able to work on this purpose 




  For the Morocco case, cropping patterns changed appreciably for all three policies on LSI 
irrigated land. Based on the model results, vegetable and fruit cultivation were significantly 
affected because most of the vegetable and fruits are profitable exports in Morocco. More land 
could be allocated to vegetable and fruit production if export of fruits and vegetables increased. 
Cropping pattern changes were also observed on the PRI land on vegetable and fruits, and rain-
fed area on crops such as cereals, forages, and other industrial crops. Comparison on water 
demand elasticity results in a relatively constant elasticity under different energy tax levels, and 
the higher the output tax rate, the more elastic the output tax policy. Water pricing at the cost 
recovery level was effective in limiting irrigation water demand in LSI irrigated land. The 
change of overall welfare in the agricultural sector was positive under this policy. There was not 
a strong response from the energy tax policy in welfare and irrigation water demand. On the 
other hand, output tax on wheat and industrial crops on LSI irrigated land worked well in 
decreasing irrigation water use while increasing welfare level.     
  Increased water prices, energy taxes, and output taxes generated extra revenue for the 
Moroccan water agency and government. Water pricing at the cost recovery level increased 
revenue by 50%. This level can be reached by an output tax as well at the 10% level. The energy 
tax policy was not effective for generating revenue compared to water pricing and output tax 
policies. 
  The major conclusions regarding to policy implications for Morocco are as follows: 1) 
low level of energy taxation should not be used if the policy goal is to limit irrigation water and 
generate government revenue; 2) the output taxation policy could be an alternative policy to 
water pricing at the cost recovery level; 3) a higher energy tax or an output tax can also meet the 




  This study also shows that the effective policy depends on the social, economics, and 
environmental contexts of specific regions. For countries like Egypt where most of land is 
irrigated, N-fertilizer tax, energy tax, and output tax on water-intensive and low profit crop 
production may be more effective than others. Morocco has both irrigated land and rain-fed land. 
Water pricing and output tax policies are better suited and effective for Morocco than water 
complementary input factor taxation. For example, energy tax policy is a comparatively less 
effective policy in Morocco, although it works well in Egypt. Findings from Morocco might be 
generalized to other countries with similar irrigation characteristics. 
  The Morocco case may be more compelling because of its diversity in irrigated (public 
and private) and rain-fed land. Taxation on crop inputs and outputs not only affect water use in 
the public irrigation sector, but private irrigation sector and rain-fed as a whole. There was an 
increase of welfare in the agricultural sector in Morocco from the model results. The irrigation 
policy on public irrigation system can improve the land allocation and hence increase welfare 
gains in rain-fed areas.    
 
Limitation and Further Research   
The research undertaken here is very important given the lack of information on irrigation policy 
with respect to water complementary input factors and high water-intensive low profit crops. The 
results demonstrated that it is a beneficial area of research for these two countries and should 
receive more attention. However, policy makers should consider that taxation policies on input 
and output factors are intervention tools that affect not only production, but the agricultural 




production technologies will all change and adjust over time. Future research should address 
these concerns. 
  Further research is needed to confirm the magnitude of the effects from each policy in the 
respective countries. The usage and distribution of water and other inputs can change when cost 
or revenue shocks are large. The assumed limited technology option and fixed yield might not be 
able to reflect the actual response in a precise manner.  The links between irrigation policy 
practice and impacts on water saving technology adoption, substitution effects among inputs, and 
the rest of economy should also be considered.  
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Table 1 Description of policy scenarios for Egypt Case. 
Scenarios Pw1  Pw2  Pw3 
N- 





Water Pricing  √   √   √                 
Input Factor Tax            √   √   √       
Output Tax                     √   √ 
Pw1: Using cost recovery price level calculated by Perry (1996)       
Pw2: Using shadow price at the 5% reduction of irrigation water       





Base Pw1 Pw2 Pw3 10% 50% 100% 50% 100% 200% 50% 100% 200% 10% 25% 50%
000 fed
Barley 74.4 -2 -3 -4 - -1 -1 - -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -1 - -
Nili Maize 304.8 -2 -9 -15 -1 -8 -15 -2 -4 -7 -6 -12 -24 - 1 1
Summer Maize 1773.5 -1 -3 -8 - -2 -5 - - -1 -2 -3 -7 - - -
Wheat 2341.8 -1 -2 -5 - -2 -4 - -1 -2 -1 -2 -5 1 1 1
Nili Sorghum 11.7 -5 -24 -46 -5 -19 -41 -5 -8 -17 - -2 5 - - -
Summer Sorghum 314.1 -1 -4 -9 - -2 -4 - - - -2 -4 -8 - - -
Paddy Rice 1340.3 -1 -4 -10 - -1 -2 - -1 -2 -2 -4 -8 -8 -21 -43
Fava bean 333.7 -3 -6 -13 - -1 -1 -3 -7 -14 -4 -8 -16 2 3 3
Soy bean 12.7 -4 -13 -30 - -5 -9 - - -3 -7 -14 -28 - - -
O t h e r  L e g u m e 4 2 . 4 - 2 - 3 - 8 - - 1 ---- - 1 - 1 -133
L o n g  B e r s e e m 1 9 3 9 . 5 - 1 - 2 - 4 ------ - 1 - 2 - 3 ---
S h o r t  B e r s e e m 5 6 1 . 6 - 1 - 2 - 5 ------ - 1 - 2 - 4 ---
Ground Nut 149.9 -1 -1 -5 - -1 -2 - -1 -1 -1 -2 -4 - - -
Lentil 5.4 - 1 -5 1 3 7 - -1 -2 - 2 2 11 26 26
Sesame 64.6 -2 -5 -11 - -2 -3 - - - -2 -3 -6 - - -
F l a x 1 8 . 2 -- - 1 -- - 1 ----- - 1 1--
C o t t o n  ( G 4 5 ) 0 . 1 1- 2 - 44- 1 - 22- 1 - 2444444
C o t t o n  ( G 7 0 ) 7 2 . 0 42- 2432432555555
C o t t o n  ( G 8 8 ) 1 0 . 6 -- 2 - 6-- 1 - 2-- 1 - 2111111
C o t t o n  ( G 8 0 ) 8 0 . 8 - 1 - 5 - 1 3 -- 2 - 6-- 1 - 4111111
C o t t o n  ( G 8 3 ) 3 1 . 9 - 2 - 5 - 1 1 - - 3 - 6 - 1 - 2 - 4 ------
C o t t o n  ( G 8 5 ) 8 0 . 9 -- 3 - 81- 1 - 2-- 1 - 3111111
C o t t o n  ( G 8 6 ) 1 1 3 . 9 1- 2 - 52-- 21-- 2333333
C o t t o n  ( G 8 9 ) 1 2 8 . 1 -- 2 - 71-- 1--- 2121211
Sugar Beet 142.6 -6 -19 -43 -5 -26 -51 -24 -47 -93 -13 -26 -52 1 - -
Sugar Cane 306.4 -3 -10 -25 -1 -6 -13 - - -1 -4 -8 -16 -16 -40 -85
C i t r u s * 9 0 7 . 0 ---------------
S u m m e r  O n i o n 1 3 . 9 1-- 22-- 11- 1 - 421-222
W i n t e r  O n i o n 5 4 . 0 1-- 32-- 21-- 321-222
Nili Potato 47.3 - -1 -1 - -2 -4 -1 -1 -3 -1 -1 -2 - - -
Summer Potato 62.5 - -1 -3 - -1 -3 -2 -3 -6 - -1 -2 - - -
Nili Tomato 67.1 - -1 -1 - -1 -2 -1 -3 -6 -1 -2 -3 - - -
Summer Tomato 200.9 -1 -2 -6 - -2 -5 -2 -5 -10 -1 -3 -6 - - -
W i n t e r  T o m a t o 1 5 7 . 8 - - 1 - - 2- 4- 2- 3- 7- 1- 1- 2 - 1 1
Nili Vegetable 153.7 - -1 -1 - -1 -2 -1 -2 -5 -1 -2 -4 - - -
Summer Vegetable 463.1 - -1 -3 - -1 -2 -1 -2 -4 -1 -1 -2 - - -
W i n t e r  V e g e t a b l e 4 2 7 . 9 ------- - 1 - 2 ------
Total Land of Cultivation 12810.9 -1 -3 -7 -0.1 -2 -3 -0.6 -1.4 -3.0 -1.4 -2.8 -5.8 -0.8 -2.7 -6.0
* Citrus cultivation is fixed in the model because most of the Egyptian fruit trees are perennials.
Crop Items
% Change from Base 
N-fertilizer Tax Scenario Pesticide Tax  Scenario Energy Tax Scenario Output Tax Scenario
% Change from Base  % Change from Base  % Change from Base  % Change from Base 
Water Pricing Scenario policy shocks
 
Table 2 Egypt: Policy Effects on Cropping Area.   
Table 3 Morocco: Crop Set and Base Cropping Patterns (1998). 
 
Crop Set  Base Cropping Area (000ha)
  LSI PRI Rain-fed
Cereals 228.6 257.4 4514.6
Legumes 2.7 3.3 371.1
Forages 8.4 11.9 42.6
Industrial Crops  94.8 - 98.3
Vegetables 58.7 184.6 45.3
Fruits 59.3 241.3 47.3
Fallow - - 592.8
Source: MASM (Doukkali, 2002). 
 
Table 4 Description of Policy Scenarios for Morocco Case. 
Scenarios Water  (LSI)  Energy  Cereals
a Industrial Crops
b  
Water Pricing  √          
Input Factor Tax    √    
Output Tax
c       √  √ 
a: Cereals: Durum wheat, Bread wheat, Barley, and Corn.        
b: Industrial Crops: Sugar Beet, Sugar Cane, Sunflower, and Peanuts.    




Table 5 Actual Volumetric Cost in Different Agricultural Zone in Morocco. 
          Agricultural Zone  Actual Cost (Dh/M
3) 
          Favorable Zone  0.681 
          Intermediate Zone  0.347 
         Unfavorable Zone East  0.642 
         Mountainous Zone*
  0.17 
         Unfavorable Southern Zone  1.026 
         Sahara (Desert) Zone  0.753 
Source: Ait Kadi. 
* Mountain Area (mainly TADLA (Beni Amir))’s  actual cost only 













Percentage of  Total 
Demand 
  (million M
3)              (%) 
Durum Wheat  158.0  8.3 
Bread Wheat  315.2  16.5 
Barley 79.9  4.2 
Corn 49.2  2.6 
Beans 3.6  0.2 
Other Pulses  1.2  0.1 
Clover 12.4  0.7 
Forages (Irrigated)  7.8  0.4 
Sugar Beets  150.0  7.9 
Sugar Cane  149.9  7.9 
Sunflower 69.9  3.7 
Peanuts 129.7  6.8 
Tomato (Under Greenhouse)  29.1  1.5 
Tomato (Seasonal)  22.4  1.2 
Potato (Seasonal)  24.5  1.3 
Melon (Under Greenhouse)  6.4  0.3 
Melon (Field)  15.4  0.8 
Other Vegetables (Seasonal)  145.0  7.6 
Vegetables ( For Processing)  27.0  1.4 
Orange 351.3  18.4 
Apricot 9.1  0.5 
Apple 18.8  1.0 
Grape 78.7  4.1 
Olive 53.5  2.8 
Total   1907.9  100  





Table 7 Morocco: Effects of Water Pricing on Cropping Area in LSI, PRI and Rain-fed 
Land. (Percentage Change from Base) 
 
Cereal
Durum Wheat 66.04 -8 36.30 -1 1010.16 -
Bread Wheat 125.49 -13 114.47 - 1379.79 -
Barley 28.77 -10 92.14 -5 1797.19 1.1
Corn 8.26 -42 14.53 -1 327.52 -0.1
Legumes
Beans 2.16 -6 2.60 - 151.38 -
Other Pulses 0.51 -66 0.70 - 219.76 -
Forages
Alfafa - - 10.96 - - -
Clover 4.13 - 0.01 0 - -
Forages (Irrigated) 4.25 - 0.91 - -
Forages (Rain-fed) - - - - 42.62 0.1
Industrial Crop
Sugar Beets 48.96 -2 - - 7.74 -
Sugar Cane 14.30 -15 - - - -
Sunflower 12.79 -34 - - 88.29 0.1
Peanuts 18.70 -10 - - 2.24 8.6
Vegetable
Tomato (Under Greenhouse) 1.59 6 2.36 6 - -
Tomato (Field) - - 1.75 7 - -
Tomato (Seasonal) 4.59 -1 9.05 - - -
Potato (Early) - - 10.50 -1 - -
Potato (Seasonal) 6.90 -2 43.11 - - -
Strawberry - - 2.42 - - -
Melon (Under Greenhouse) 0.35 0 0.63 1 - -
Melon (Field) 4.50 -1 17.17 - - -
Other Vegetables ( Under Greenhouse) - - 0.95 7 - -
Other Vegetables (Field) - - 2.30 4 - -
Other Vegetables (Seasonal) 35.59 -1 86.28 - - -
Vegetables (Dry-land) - - - - 45.28 -
Vegetables ( For Processing) 5.21 17 8.14 12 - -
Fruits
Orange 37.80 -1 35.30 1 - -
Apricot 1.24 0 12.68 -2 - -
Apple 2.74 -1 25.03 -1 - -
Grape 13.46 -1 25.71 -1 10.79 0.5
Olive 4.06 1 80.79 1 - -
Other tree crop - - 61.81 - 36.53 -
Fallow (Dry-land Only) - - - - 592.79 0.4
Total Cultivation of  Land 452.38 -8 698.57 -0.50 5712.08 0.4
% Change Base   (000 Ha) % Change Base(000Ha)  Crop Items
LSI PRI Rain-fed





Table 8 Morocco: Effects of Energy Tax and Output Tax on Cropping Area in LSI Land. 
(Percentage Change from Base) 
50% 100% 200% 2% 5% 10%
Cereals
          Durum Wheat -4 -9 -18 -8 -21 -43
B r e a d  W h e a t- 5- 6- 7 - 4 - 1 1
Barley -2 -2 -2 - 2 -100
Corn -25 -29 -29 -26 -44 -74
Legumes
                      Beans 27 55 -6 40 100 198
Other Pulses -4 -9 -18 - - -
Forages
Clovers -20 -46 -81 - - 1
Other Forages Irrigated - - - - - -
Industrial Crops
Sugar Beet -1 -2 -3 -2 -4 -8
Sugar Cane -3 -5 -9 -1 -3 -7
Sunflower -10 -19 -39 3 -8 -17
Peanuts -3 -7 -13 -8 -20 -41
Vegetables
Tomatoes under Greenhouses 6 6 5 7 7 7
Seasonal Tomato - -1 -1 - - -
Potatoes in Season - -1 -1 - - -
Melon under Greenhouse 2 1 -2 3 3 3
Field Melons - - -1 - - -
Other vegetables in season - -1 -2 - - -
Vegetables for Processing 18 18 18 46 80 109
Fruits
O r a n g e444 55
A p r i c o t s222 22
Apple - - - - - -
Grape -3 -7 -16 1 1 1
Olive 1 1 1 3 4 5
Total Cultivation of  Land -3 -5 -8 -2 -6 -20



















Table 9 Morocco: Effects of Energy Tax and Output Tax on Cropping Area in PRI Land. 
(Percentage Change from Base) 
 
50% 100% 200% 2% 5% 10%
Cereals
Durum Wheat -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -
Bread Wheat - - - - - -
Barley -4 -4 -5 -6 -4 -4
Corn -1 -1 -2 -2 -2 -2
Legumes
Beans - - - - - -
O t h e r  P u l s e s---- --
Forages
Alfalfa - - - - - -
Clover - -1 - - -1 -1
Other Forages Irrigated - - - - - -
Vegetables
Tomatoes under greenhouses 6 6 6 6 6 6
F i e l d  T o m a t o7776 6
Seasonal Tomato - - - - - -
Early Potato -1 -1 -1 5 5 5
Potatoes in Season - - - - - -
S t r a w b e r r y1--- --
Melon under Greenhouse 1 2 2 - - -
Field Melon - - - - - -
Other Vegetables in Greenhouse 7 7 7 7 7 7
O t h e r  V e g e t a b l e s  G r o w n  i n  F i e l d4444 4
Other vegetables in season - - - - - -
vegetables for processing 11 11 11 1 -7 -8
Fruits
O r a n g e---- --
A p r i c o t- 2- 2- 2- 2 - 2-
A p p l e- 1- 1- 1- 1 - 1-
Grape -1 - - -1 -1 -1
Olive 1 1 - 1 2 2
Other tree crops - - - - - -
Total Cultivation of  Land -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.7 -0.6 -0.6


















Table 10 Morocco: Effects of Energy Tax and Output Tax on Cropping Area in Rain-fed 
Land. (Percentage Change from Base) 
 
50% 100% 200% 2% 5% 10%
Cereals
Durum Wheat - - - -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
Bread Wheat - - - -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Barley 1 2.5 1 1.61 2.68 6.2
Corn - -0.2 -0.4 0.05 0.01 -0.05
Legumes
B e a n s------
O t h e r  P u l s e s------
Forages
Rain fed forage 4 9 15.8 - - -
Industrial Crops
S u g a r  B e e t------
Sunflower - 0.1 0.1 - 0.1 0.1
Peanuts 2.8 5.6 11.3 6.9 17.2 34.4
Vegetables
V e g e t a b l e s  i n  D r y - l a n d------
Fruits
Grape 0.6 1 1.8 0.3 0.2 0.2
O t h e r  T r e e  C r o p s------
Fallow -- 0 . 2 0 . 1 - 0 . 1
Total Cultivation of  Land 0.3 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.9 2








Table 11 Morocco: Import Change from Base (%) 
 
Water Pricing Scenario
Cost Recovery Level 50% 100% 200% 2% 5% 10%
Durum wheat 3 2 4 7 3.3 7.8 15.9
Bread wheat 2 111 0 . 7 1 . 6 2 . 9
Barley 4 2-4---
Corn - ------
Beans 1 -2 -4 1 -2.9 -7.4 -14.7
Other Pulses - ------
Raw Sugar 5 124 1 . 4 3 . 5 7 . 1
Sunflower - ------
Raw Sunflower Oil 3 1 2 3 -0.1 0.7 1.5
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NF (*) – N-fertilizer Tax ,  PEST(*) - pesticide tax, ENG (*) - energy tax,  OUTP(*) – output tax
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Figure 6 Morocco: Revenue Generated from Each Policy Scenario (million Dh). 
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